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TOLSTOI AND T HE DOCT R I N E OF PE ACE
Nowhere in modern times, I dare say, have the ideals that
the current war in Europe has violated found a more moving
exposition than in the later works of Tolstoi. Is war right ?
Are any of our hopes, or beliefs, or ideas worth fighting for?
Tolstoi spent the last thirty years of his life giving these old and
almost trite questions an impassioned negative. It is impossible
to say what his influence has been. No corner of the world but
has his admirers, even his disciples. The cult of peace has
perhaps never had so many followers. And yet the irony of the
present war, coming, as indeed he foresaw, within a few years
of his death, is not without its comment on an inveterate militancy in the human passions that no interim of peace has as
yet long suppressed.
There is a temptation to say that the past, even the present,
is no criterion for the future. To stick forever at the limits of
what has been is a poor-spirited way of taking life, unimaginative, not even pedestrian. Men change. No outworn and
discarded institution but has had in its own day the support of
the argument from reality. We have passed through and le
behind conditions which had seemed too deeply rooted in
human nature ever to go out—that human nature that has been
the stalking horse for so many human weaknesses! At the same
time hope and prediction gain no support from the bare fact
that men do change, or even from the analogy of other hopes
deferred but at last triumphant. Change has intensified many
an evil; and there are hopes deferred over which the hearts of
imen are still sick. Expectation must grow on firmer ground,
1
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on the character of the idea itself—in relation, inevitably however, to that elastic but persistent human nature that has, as
war has proved, its breaking point.
If the ideal is that of peace, the task is one for the reason.
And this from logical necessities that strike one at the outset.
In the first place the ideal of peace, unlike every other ideal, has
deprived itself at a stroke of the normal last resort of selfdefence. It can not take to arms. It has nothing to support
it but its own degree of reasonableness. This would be a disadvantage a li le hard to bear in the stress of practice. But it
would have to be borne. The feelings, too, can hardly enter
into the ma er in more than a secondary and remote way.
The ideal of peace is not the love of peace and not the hope that
peace may indefinitely prevail. It diﬀers from these feelings
much as the ideal of universal love diﬀers from the love of
friends, or as any guiding principle diﬀers from the corresponding instinctive enjoyment. For it is just the dreary function of
the principle to regulate us when the instinctive enjoyment
fails and the instinct rears itself in opposition.
And it will be just the dreary function of the ideal of peace
to keep us unarmed when all our instincts are for fight. Moods
and feelings change and only the passing one is valid. They
are the running obligato to the current situation; as we listen
it is only the passing cadence that moves us. Love of peace
gives way to the passions of war. But the reason stays pre y
much the same. And if we are to have something to fall back
upon when our feelings are for war, it must be the recollection
of a firm logic prepared in times when heads were cool. This
restriction too has its disadvantage for the moment of practical
need. It disarms the strongest ally of concerted action. But
for the rational consideration of it there is a simplification in
the enforced riddance of all but the rational appeal. We can
hold ourselves the more persistently to the plain logic of the
case, without sacrifice of essential factors, and without a dogging
reflection that if logic fails there will still be a way out.
If the examination of the doctrine of peace, therefore, is a
task for the reason, Europe is scarcely in a state to-day to
undertake it. One may question, indeed, whether the temper
of America is quite cool enough. We have wished passionately
for peace. And we have thrown our sympathies on the whole
against the nations which we believe to have been responsible
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for its breach. But the very presence of those sympathies
rather takes the ground from under our feet. For we can
hardly in logic sympathize even with a war against war without
commi ing ourselves to the principle of war—that certain ideas
are a er all worth fighting for. It is because of just such inconsistencies that one may question whether our peace propagandists have in reality faced the problem in all its implications—
whether they have not rather merely intensified their love of
peace and their hope for its duration, without a too curious
examination of their own logic, and without a full sense of all
that the ideal must carry with it. For such superficiality, if it
exists, Tolstoi is an ample corrective.
I
The examination dare hardly be cursory. Tolstoi, whether
right or wrong, drank deeply of life, and touched it in many
places with a nature so intense and a mind so well equipped that
he carries us far below the surface. It is perhaps hazardous to
venture an analysis of the reason; but if we may for the moment
speak of it as falling into the religious reason on the one hand
and the worldly reason on the other, we may view more clearly
the two kinds of defence that Tolstoi oﬀered for his ideal. And
though he himself made no such dry categories for his impassioned appeals it may simplify our own task to risk them. We
may do this with a be er conscience, moreover, because we
have agreed to be dryly logical.
For Tolstoi the doctrine of peace was a religious dogma.
But it was peculiar in this, that instead of being the dogma of a
religion already accepted, the dogma and the religion evolved in
his mind together. The dogma was, in eﬀect, the religion.
And this fact oﬀers so salient a surface to the consideration of
what I have called the religious reason that if we are to take
him on his own ground it will be well to follow the development
that ended so significantly.
He began far enough away from both peace and moral fervor.
At twenty-four he was a junker in the Russian army, and he
fought through the Crimean war. And he was an aristocrat, an
idler, a property owner, a man of le ers, a libertine. “He
is going the pace, “ wrote Tourgénef from Petersburg shortly
a er the war, “sprees, gypsy girls, cards all night long—and
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then he sleeps like a corpse till two in the a ernoon. “His
youth and his prime held, indeed, infinitely more than that, but
they held that too. There follows from his Confession, published in 1879, the culmination of his life a er forty-five years
of rare success and distinction :

idiot. How he emerged is a long and intricate tale of half
rational, half spontaneous perceptions along the only path
that leads out of such depths—the path of religious faith. For
if a cosmic despair comes from a failure to find a significance
revealed in life itself—from a failure to find a larger idea or will
to which it contributes—the only hope must come from the
conception of such an idea or will. That is, essentially, religion.
It takes no li le courage, indeed, to face life in the crisis
that comes to men of intelligence whose passion is for wisdom,
and justice, and religious assurance. For what confronts them
is the perception that all they care for is immaterial, insubstantial; that unlike knowledge it is not based on facts and is not
susceptible of accumulation in external repositories; that it
leads its precarious existence in the shi ing desires of men.
They have to bear the perception that just these supreme things
have no sanction but men’s passionate convictions, and that
when conviction opposes conviction there is no appeal but to
force. And force itself, though it determines which shall
prevail, does nothing in the event to determine which is right.
It is the belief of such natures that there is such a thing as
truth, and that if truth could be found it would free men from
just this plight. But what truth is there is no one to say.
The fault, a er all, if fault must be imputed for such a sorry
state of aﬀairs, is to be laid at the door of humanity itself. If
humanity had been content, so to speak, with its merely brute
life, it could have got on with its eating and drinking and
propagation without troubling itself with vague aspirations for
it hardly even yet knows what. But it was not content. It had
its vague aspirations. And it devised infinite maxims, rules.
laws, principles by which to a ain its uncertain end. Moral
aﬀairs are an arbitrary invention. They have their origin
in growing nuclei of human desires and opinions, and have
their sanction only in the strength and prevalence of belief.
Men do, it may be, grope in the dark for ultimate truth, but
ultimate truth still lies hidden. And though now here and now
there a man believes he had found it, yet he has no assurance
but his inner conviction—which from another’s point of view
is no be er than his own—indeed not so good. If such a
description seems to repudiate the authority of religion it must
still appear that religion is in the same case, resting either upon
arbitrarily conceded authority or upon passionate belief ;
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“My life came to a standstill. I could breathe, eat, drink, and sleep, and
I could not help doing these things; but there was no life for there were no
wishes the fulfilment of which I could consider reasonable. . . . Had a fairy
oﬀered to fulfil my desires I should not have known what to ask. . . . If in
moments of intoxication I felt something which I can not call a wish, but a habit
le by former wishes, in sober moments I knew this to be a delusion, and that
there was nothing to wish for. I could not even wish to know the truth, for I
guessed in what it consisted. The truth was that life is meaningless. . . .
“It had come to this, that I, a healthy, fortunate man, felt I could no
longer live; some irresistible power impelled me to rid myself one way or
another of life. I can not say I wished to kill myself. The power which
drew me away from life was stronger, fuller, and more widespread than any
mere wish.
“The thought of self-destruction now came upon me as naturally as thoughts
of how to improve my life had come formerly. And it was so seductive that I
had to be wily with myself lest I should carry it out too hastily. . . . And it
was then that I, a man favoured by fortune, hid a cord from myself, lest I
should hang myself from the cross-piece of the partition in my room where I
undressed alone every evening; and I ceased to go out shooting with a gun,
lest I should be tempted by so easy a way of ending my life.
“Involuntarily it appeared to me that there, somewhere, is someone who
amuses himself by watching how I live for thirty or forty years, learning,
developing, maturing in body and mind, and how-having now with matured
mental powers reached the summit of life, from which it all lies before me, I
stand on that summit—like an arch-fool—seeing clearly that there is nothing in
life, and that there has been and will be nothing. And he is amused. . . .
“To-day or to-morrow sickness and death will come (they have come already) to those I love or to me; nothing will remain but stench and worms.
Sooner or later my deeds, whatever they may have been, will be forgo en,
and I shall not exist. Then why go on making any eﬀort? How can a man
fail to see this? And how go on living? That is what is surprising. One can
only live when one is intoxicated with life; as soon as one is sober it is
impossible not to see that it is all a mere fraud! That is precisely what it is
there is nothing either amusing or wi y about it; it is simply cruel and stupid.”

All this takes us pre y near the bo om, Tolstoi lived on,
however, thus submerged in despair. Moments of hope gave
him from time to time a breath of life. But as o en he sank
back, going over and over the pages of his own experience, and
of the life about him, and of the past, only to find his conclusions confirmed by his readings. Life was a tale told by an
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and that if an overruling providence is concerned with the
growth of truth and justice and wisdom among men, he still
works only through natural and human sanctions.
It was just this disheartening perception that sent Tolstoi
in search of a calmer resting-place outside the turmoil. He
found it, indeed, in Christianity, but in a Christianity curiously
bent to his own purpose. It was a Christianity purged of all
ritual and institutional expressions, and of all historical accumulations. It was based on the Gospels, but not on all of them or
on all parts of any of them. It was a selection of particular
u erances of Christ.
Inevitably such an eclecticism implies a standard of selection. This was supplied in Tolstoi’s case by the consistent
development of another idea in his mind. He was a Slav,
and he inherited the deep inertia of Oriental passivism. This
took shape in an aversion to practical aﬀairs, to all organization, to parts within parts, to subordination. The spectacle
of industrial, political, and social life filled him with horror
because they were systems and complex—ungovernable by
the simpler formulas of personal wisdom. No doubt it was
from this predisposition that he found himself deeply aﬀected by
the writings of Rousseau. At all events no other secular
writer had held him so steadfastly. And the primitivism of
that arch-romanticist gave the bent that fixed the inclination of
his later years.
“And indeed,” he says in a later part of his Confession, “ the bird lives so
that it must fly, collect food, and build its nest; and when I see the bird doing
that I joy in its joy. The goat, hare, and wolf live so that they must feed
themselves, and propagate, and feed their families, and when they do so I
feel firmly assured that they are happy and that their life is a reasonable one.
And what does man do? He should earn a living as the beasts do, but with this
diﬀerence—that he would perish if he did it alone; he has to procure it not for
himself but for all. When he does that I have a firm assurance that he is
happy, and that his life is reasonable. “

It was but a step, if a step, to the simple ideal of the peasant’s life. And this ideal from now on determined for Tolstoi
the whole aim of his philosophy. To work with one’s hands in
the fields, to provide for all one’s own wants, to make one’s
own house, and clothes and shoes, and to do this co-operatively
with one’s neighbours—that was the perfect thing. It did away
with all the larger complexities of the social organization—with
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administration, regulation, system, subordination, with all but
the personal relation of man to man—and le the village and the
pastoral tribe again the largest social unit. With the spectacle
constantly before him of the villages of his own estate, it was not
hard to determine the hindrances to such an ideal. The
peasants were forced to pay taxes, to pay rent, and to contribute
to the defence of their country in military service. All of these
compulsions were contrary to their immediate desires, and
contrary to the primitive simplicity of the life that nature
seemed to have suggested to men in the example of the brutes.
Moreover rent, taxes, and military service were contributions to
that part of life that he had come to abhor. That life took its
objective expression in property and government; and behind
property and government, as their only sanction, was the principle of force.
The religious doctrine that emerged was simplifying. The
Christian Gospels are indeed baﬄing, sometimes contradictory.
But one who goes to them with a predisposition got elsewhere
as a principle of selection, and with no regard to the authority of
the documents themselves, finds the task fairly simple. It was
by virtue of such an a itude that Tolstoi could ignore, for
instance, the incident of Cæsar’s taxes, and the incident of the
money-changers in the temple, and pronounce as the central
doctrine of Christ the sweeping principle of physical non-resistance. This principle undermined at a stroke all property, all
government, the whole complex organization of society—
undermined all that seemed to lie in the way of the ideal life
of the peasant. Such was the evolution in Tolstoi’s mind of the
religion of peace.
The disturbing element in this evolution is the essentially
secular origin of the predilection from which it took its start.
For given such a predilection it was not hard to draw from the
Scriptures a body of principles which would rationally fit with
it. What is hard is to clothe such a selection with the sanctions
of religion. Anyone alas !—even the devil himself—can quote
Scripture for any opinion: For Tolstoi, indeed, it had full religious authority, for he had given it the voluntary acquiescence
that is the essential note of religious faith. It could therefore
solve his own personal problem, and aﬀord a resting-place for
his own spirit. But for other men who were oppressed by the
infinality of the worldly reason, it could, except by coincidence,
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aﬀord no resting-place at all. For when he had rejected the
Bible, and even any whole unit of it to which a religious faith
might have a ributed an authority that was more than human,
the weight of authority fell back upon his own very human
judgment—on the discriminations and selections of his worldly
reason. They were too clearly not dogma, but dogmatism.
When all is said, the words of the prophet gain their authority through the abdication of his own reason in favour of a
reason higher still. Newman falling back on Rome before the
advance of rationalism in the Anglican church was more consistent with religious logic. For not only did he accept the
Bible as absolute, but he accepted a current interpretation
of it that was more absolute still. His own reason played no
part in the postulation of ultimate truth. He had shi ed
the responsibility to an oracle whose foundation went back into
a dim antiquity where tradition said that God Himself had
spoken. It was in the hope of peace, indeed, that both men
sought their religious solutions. But in this too Newman would
seem to have been more essentially religious. For if religion
is a spiritual ma er, Tolstoi’s peace was but remotely spiritual.
Its dogma was physical non-resistance. For Newman, on the
other hand, peace meant the serenity of the spirit itself, the
surcease of his cosmic unrest, the peace that passeth all understanding. The clash of bodily force was but an aspect of that
physical life for which Christianity was but li le concerned—
an aﬀair of Cæsar’s. The object of his quest was a refuge from
just those troublings that the worldly reason was so helpless
before. He found his peace in a surrender of his worldly
reason before the predicated infallibility of Rome.
The world, however, has found something cold and archaic in
this apparent giving-up. It fails to stir the modem sense. It
means the relinquishment of too many passionately felt, individually conceived ideas—the resignation of too many precious
heritances of independence and reason. But if we look thus
closely into the roots of this antagonism to Newman’s solution
we may detect a latent irony awaiting those who find Tolstoi
and his doctrine of physical peace more to their liking. For
the very reasons that make the la er seem so much more vital
are the militant hopes and aspirations that lie at the springs
not of peace, but of war—the sense that their understanding
is not to be passively resigned, that there is something in
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the moral individuality too poignantly their one ultimate
possession to be given up without compunction. They
have not perhaps remembered that the physical peace that
they have looked for can not come until such a surrender is
made. For only when men relinquish their individual sense of
right and truth in favour of some arbitrary authority will such
peace actually come. Rome, Germany, England, Russia,
America—some one’s authority will have to be acknowledged
and all other opinion relinquished, or there can be no peace.
There seems, however, to be no such tendency to-day. Our
peace advocates have kept their moral freedom. They have
not, like Newman, put themselves on a peace footing, physical
or spiritual.
In the end it is the eﬀect of Tolstoi’s religious doctrine that
it has le the problem essentially where he found it—with
truth and right still resting on men’s passionately held opinion.
If he found the worldly plight intolerable because the world
yielded him no answer to his questionings, and no absolute
standards by which to measure conflicting beliefs, it was no
escape from this plight to erect but another opinion for men
to disagree upon. We find ourselves, as a consequence, back in
the province of the worldly reason.
II
If Tolstoi’s religious reason le the problem still unsolved,
he himself did not abandon it at that. He went on a acking it
in right worldly terms. And indeed there is much to be said
about it in this manner. For in logical thought there is something so uniform that we are not u erly without grounds of
harmony and peace aside from religious precept. The universality of mathematics, for instance, in which struggle takes the
form of rivalry and emulation, stands as a kind of exemplar of
what the reason can do to bring men together in amity and
agreement.
But the moral reason, alas! is not the mathematical reason.
It has no such stable premises. It tries to rear a structure, but
its foundations are unstable desires, and vague and elusive
aspirations. Barmaid and scholar, St. Francis and Napoleon,
Germany and France, Middle Age and Renaissance—its premises shi and vary from person to person, from people to
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people, from time to time. And it is over moral ma ers that
men go to war; not over ma ers of knowledge.
This distinction comes home to Tolstoi because the religious
intransigence with which he assumed his tenet of non-resistance
took on perforce, when he asserted it for other men, the character of a mathematical postulate. “A true Christian,” he
averred, “will always prefer to be killed by a madman than to
deprive him of his liberty,”—or let a child be killed by a drunkard, he assented, than prevent its death by physical interference.
This intransigence was characteristic of all the thinking of his
later years. A er he had wri en the Kreutzer Sonata and
had formulated the law of perfect chastity, he stood unmoved
by all sense of consequences. Be er the race should perish
in a generation, he said, than that the principle should be
relaxed. There is a touch of the heroic in such an a itude, as
of a Galileo maintaining a natural law that could aﬀord in its
eternity to mock at the ephemeral opinions of men. But it
was a er all an heroic futility. There is no such finality in the
moral law.
Curiously enough Tolstoi was aware of this mathematical
complexion of his logic, though not apparently of the fallacy of
it. He used the geometric analogy again and again to defend
the dogmatism of his assertions. Answering a critic he returned :
“He does not realize when he says that the commandment
of non-resistance in the doctrine of Christ is an exaggeration,
that he is like one who, teaching the theory of the circle,
declares that the equality of the radii is an exaggeration.”
The diﬃculty is of course that the circle is a er all a mere postulate with all its laws implied in its universal definition, while
in the moral life, not only is there no universal definition of the
perfect thing, and no agreement as to its a ainment, but these
disagreements are just the occasion of all the evils the assumption proposes to correct. In eﬀect, therefore, the intransigent
postulation of the perfect thing in the moral world quite begs
the question.
“Although we can never draw a mathematically straight
line,” he wrote, “we must never make another definition of a
straight line than ‘the shortest distance between two points.’ ”
He would not see that in the moral world we are forever limited
to the drawing of lines, and are trying to draw them straight,
but that the definition of a straight line is just the thing no one
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can make. We know neither the location of the points, nor the
shortest distance between them. He would not see that the
function of the moralist was not, like the mathematicians,
to conceive the ideal and u er counsels of perfection, but rather
to guide men in the intermediate steps in a very real and very
baﬄing world. Here too, therefore, just as in his religious
solution, he has failed to meet the diﬃculty. Just as there he
met the insuﬃciency of the worldly reason with another worldly
reason, so here he has met the problem of right living with a
counsel of perfection.
III
Perhaps not many who hold the ideal of peace to-day have
laid for it such deep foundations as Tolstoi has tried to do.
Whether they might not have succeeded be er if they had tried
is a question that justifies a degree of quiet skepticism. If,
weary of the infinality of the worldly reason, they had gone to
religion for those standards upon which to base their judgments
and guide their conduct, they would still have had to submit to
established authority or else to proceed by a rational selection
of dogmas. In the one case they would have had to abandon
their own beliefs, even their belief in peace if that were not
among the tenets of the accepted church. And in the other
case they would have found the clearness of their own inner consistency roiled by the consciousness that they had started with a
secular predilection to which the religious colour must forever
seem but a superficial gloss. If they had resorted to dogmatism,
they must have ignored the baﬄing realities that make the very
problem they have sought to cure.
The course le to pursue, it would seem, is to abandon the
mathematical reason, and follow the moral reason as far as it
will take us. But there is a fatal diﬃculty in the way of this
procedure. For if the moral reason goes forward by first
examining the situation about it, and then finding the best that
can be made of it, it can hardly, on this particular journey, discern an ideal of peace at the end of any vista. Tolstoi’s own
experience would seem to be an epitome of the diﬃculty. He
had faced the moral dilemma from the point of view of a life
rarely varied and deep. He saw that moral ideas have no
sanction but the intensity of men’s belief and their willingness
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to defend them to the utmost. He saw that for those ideas,
therefore, the only chance to prevail is the fighting chance.
And his moral logic refused to assert that to give up that chance
was the best that could be made of it. The ideal of peace, as he
saw, must be got at a leap or it was not to be had. In his
geometric method, therefore, there was the logic of necessity.
What is le for us, then, is to follow that method, assume
the ideal, deduce its implications, and see whether, in the light of
the moral reason, they prove to be the things our love of peace
prefigures them.
And here it is that Tolstoi is enlightening. He saw fearlessly and fully what the ideal implied. Those who merely want
peace, he would have said, will go on as before; they do not
count; everyone wants peace. Only those who believe in the
principle of peace and disbelieve in the principle of war are with
us, for only they have a constant guide to steady them when
their feelings waver. The principle of war is force. The
principle of peace is non-resistance. They must have the
courage to face the fact that the principle of peace undermines
all forms of property and all forms of government.
“. . . a true Christian,” he says, “not only can not claim any right of property, but the term property can not have any significance for him. All that
he uses a Christian only uses until someone takes it away from him. He can
not defend his property so he can not have any.” “. . . for a true Christian
the term government can not have any signification and reality. Government is for a Christian only regulated violence; Government, States, Nations,
property, Churches, all these for a true Christian are only words without
meaning; he can understand the meaning other people a ach to those
words, but for him they have none. No compromise!”

There is indeed no compromise for those who cling to the
ideal of peace. Property and government are nothing without
the exercise of all necessary force. The case of property is
interesting for the very simplicity of the demonstration—“All
that he uses a Christian only uses till someone takes it away from
him. He can not defend his property so he can not have
any.” There is a kind of irony not without illumination in the
aloofness with which Tolstoi regarded the actual societies
that sprang up under the inspiration of his teaching. He would
have nothing to do with them—was impatient even at casual
reference to them. They broke up one a er another through
troubles the very sordid trivialness of which made a kind of
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Elizabethan low-comedy incongruity with the noble aspirations
with which they set out, A youth—typically in one of the
communes—awoke before his elder bed-fellow, and seeing a
figured waistcoat among his companion’s clothes, desired it,
took it, and would not part with it, And indeed on the principle
of non-resistance to which the commune was commi ed he was
right. There was no meum and tuum. He wanted the waistcoat—and the commune disbanded. Men may indeed agree
upon a modus vivendi by which to adjust a conflict of desires,
but without the support of force such agreements are, simply,
without force when men don’t agree.
The case of government is only a degree less obvious. We
do indeed grant it but reluctantly. The policeman as he saunters down his beat seems too feeble in the presence of the mass of
citizens who throng by him to do more than symbolize an
empty convention, relic of an older time when burghers were
indeed ruled by the armed will of their over-lords. But when
we inquire into the sanctions behind the laws we make, we find
nothing but that sauntering policeman. Our child-labour
inventions, marriage-law conventions, socialistic conventions
come together, express their aspirations, appeal to our reason,
touch our sympathies; but they adjourn and children go on
working in factories, Reno flourishes, poverty and riches live on
side by side. Such conventions have all the power that nonresistance can give them, And yet who that does not obey them
now would obey them then when non-resistance was the principle of government? There would be no such thing as law but
only the airy dreams of legislators,
It is perhaps a hard saying, but it has to be said, that government is nothing but the imposition by force of the will of the
stronger upon the weaker. Whether the murderer, the swindler,
the robber may not be absolutely right, no one knows, We deal
with them because we are stronger than they and they have
violated our opinions. Democracy seems at first sight to be a
relaxation of this law. The popular voice in framing statutes
and the “common consent” of the governed veil the appearance
of imposition. And yet in fact democracy is a fuller expression
of it than other forms of government—a franker admission that
the laws are but the conventions of the stronger majority, without illusion of divine right or even of a closer approximation
to absolute truth. No government—democracy, monarchy,
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tyranny—has any other sanction for its laws than the force
it can muster. Nothing, as Tolstoi saw, is consistent with the
ideal of peace but anarchy.
The diﬃculty—if now that we have the implications before
us I may venture a criticism on the basis of stubborn reality and
the moral reason—lies in the bare fact that if nothing but
anarchy is consistent with the ideal of peace, nothing is so
inconsistent as anarchy with the reality of peace. Demonstrations lie all about us. We have tried anarchy and we have
not been able to bear it. The history of the West illustrates
how quickly men find u er freedom intolerable. To Tolstoi,
indeed, such illustrations were abhorrent; they dragged the
purity of truth down to the dust. Strangely enough the
realistic novelist of War and Peace and Anna Karenina would
grant to reality no authority at all in his philosophy. But for
us, who are trying to find a way through the dust itself, it takes
but a glance at our own peaceful neighbourhood or quiet profession to know that men do disagree and trample on the hopes
and dreams and beliefs of others; and that without government
to express authoritatively the collective sense of the community
and suppress its grosser violations we should be farther from
peace than we are now for all our occasional wars.
If compromise with reality is of the essence of the moral law,
however, it seems only rational to ask why it should not be
possible to halt at a point between government and property on
the one hand and war on the other. But if we proceed with
the moral reason such a point aﬀords us no resting-place. For
if we have commi ed ourselves to the right of government
to administer its laws with all necessary force upon its unarmed
citizens, we could hardly logically hesitate at their enforcement
upon armed citizens or upon armed aliens within the frontiers.
If it should draw the line there we should have a government
abdicating in favour of any man with a weapon. And we
should have anarchy on the morrow. Government is, in
practice, impossible without admi ing the principle of war.
There is, it is true, a justifiable plea for an ideal that it is
an ideal, distant, perhaps una ainable, and yet a thing to have
in mind, to strive toward however slowly. And it is, I take it,
in this sense that most of those who cling to the ideal of peace
still give it their allegiance. But an incidental weakness lies
at the base of such an a itude. We have indeed objected that
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u er intransigence belongs to the mathematical rather than to
the moral reason. But if we look closely at this particular
case we shall find, even from the moral point of view, that
unless it is intransigent it is nothing. We do not ordinarily say
that the least transgression nullifies a moral ideal; we try again
and again a er repeated failures. But the ideal of peace does
not aﬀord us such a chance. War has this diﬀerence from other
transgressions that it is in itself a dire extremity, a last resort.
Our instinctive love of peace ordinarily suﬃces. The temptation to war comes normally but once in a lifetime. As a consequence the ideal must work at just that one moment or it has
no use at all. If it fails once in a lifetime it leaves the situation
just as it is. If it is not intransigent, therefore, it is indeed
nothing. We can not gradually strive for it. We must take it
or leave it. A new generation is on our heels, for it too there
can be no compromise.
It is possible, indeed, to abandon the ideal as such, and to
look for permanent peace through the intensification of that
love of peace that has already reduced war to an occasion of once
in a lifetime. If this seems the most rational of all a itudes,
it is, at the same time, I dare say, the most insidious, the most
weighted with dire consequences, threatening the constitution
of the moral world itself. It contains a flaw that grows under
examination into an appreciable breach with the very morality
it sets out to serve. Not that some wars may not be averted
by calm reflection and the love of peace. And not that arbitration may not now and again tide over moments of unwise passion. All that goes without saying. But to commit oneself
to the hope for permanent peace is to beli le the importance
of moral ideas themselves.
For the simple, clear implication of such a hope is that it
is be er to let falsehood, injustice, every form of wrong prevail
than to li a hand against them. It is a protest against holding
out for right to the last ditch. It says with finality that right
is not worth fighting for. Be er see one’s country overrun, his
home destroyed, his family violated, his liberty taken away,
than die resisting to the utmost. More broadly still it is a protest against the only eﬀective tenure that right and justice and
truth have in the world. For such ideas have their only existence in men’s convictions. If they lived anywhere else, as
knowledge lives not only in men’s memories but also in lasting
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records, they might have a chance of survival when convictions
slacken. But they do not. Men’s convictions are their existence. And to protest against the extremity of conviction is to
protest against the only life they have. It is to put the tenuous
chance for their survival in the world into sudden disrepute.
There emerges a paradox which perhaps may best be seen
in the dryness of a diagram. Li le by li le as civilization has
fought its slow way upward, it has grown by accumulating, now
here and now there, bodies of common opinion. Since nature
itself provides no standards of truth and right, each accumulation expresses something very precious that comes as near
to truth and right as it can a ain. The hope for the growth
of civilization lies in the chance that those who come nearest,
whose agreement embodies the greatest justice and the greatest
wisdom, shall maintain themselves and grow in volume and
extent. If then the less wise and just should accept the ideal of
peace, throw down their defences, and care no more to uphold
their foolish opinions, the hope for both civilization and peace
would be great indeed. Such a consummation would perhaps
have its ironic comment on the wisdom of the ideal, but the
logical diﬃculty would be tolerable in the glory of the event
itself. The despair of such a consummation, however, lies in
the diﬃculty of selecting the less wise and just, and ge ing them
to accept the ideal. Only if the ideal were really wise would
selection be possible. For then it would be the wise who
would accept it, while the others maintained their fighting front.
But then not only would the hope of civilization be lost, but
also the hope of peace. Only if all should cease to care to
defend their sense of right and justice would peace at last prevail. But then right and justice would have foregone their
living chance.
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